

RELEASED IN PART  
1.4(D), 1.4(B)

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PTQ7106

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ACTION AF-01

|      |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |
|------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| INFO | LOG-00 | AID-01  | CIAE-00 | SMEC-00 | OASY-00 | DODE-00 | DOEE-00 |
|      | EAP-01 | EUR-01  | H-01    | TEDE-00 | INR-00  | IO-14   | L-01    |
|      | ADS-00 | M-00    | NEA-01  | NSAE-00 | NSCE-00 | OIC-02  | OMB-01  |
|      | PA-01  | PM-00   | PRS-01  | P-01    | SB-00   | SCT-00  | SP-00   |
|      | SS-00  | TRSE-00 | T-00    | USIE-00 | SNIS-00 | NISC-01 | PMB-00  |
|      | DRL-09 | G-00    | /037W   |         |         |         |         |

-----A70FB8 151617Z /38

P 151613Z FEB 95  
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7126  
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
AMEMBASSY MADRID  
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI  
USEU BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
AMEMBASSY KIGALI  
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
USMISSION GENEVA  
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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AMEMBASSY BONN

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AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000881

FOR AF/C AND EUR/UBI

E.O 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, RW, NL

SUBJECT: GON CONSIDERING REQUEST TO GUIDE  
- RWANDAN RECONCILIATION PROCESS

REF: A) STATE 31464, B) BRUSSELS 1791

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE FOLLOWED UP WITH [REDACTED] ON A/S  
[REDACTED] MOOSE'S REQUEST THAT THE GON TAKE THE LEADE IN  
THE INTERNATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS FOR  
RWANDA. [REDACTED] SAID A DECISION MEMO IS  
SITTING ON THE DESKS OF FM VAN MIERLO AND  
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION (AID) MINISTER PRONK.  
HE COULD NOT PREDICT WHETHER THE MINISTERS WOULD  
BE INTERESTED IN PURSUING THE IDEA, NOR EVEN  
WHEN THEY WOULD DECIDE (NOTE: FM VAN MIERLO IS  
CURRENTLY IN SURINAME AND HEADS TO WASHINGTON  
NEXT WEEK. END NOTE.).

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3. [REDACTED] SAID THE GON AGREES WITH A/S  
MOOSE'S ASSESSMENT THAT SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE  
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DONE QUICKLY. WHILE FLATTERED BY WASHINGTON'S  
DISPLAY OF CONFIDENCE IN THE HAGUE, OFFICIALS  
WERE GENUINELY SURPRISED THAT WE HAD ASKED THE  
NETHERLANDS TO TAKE THE LEAD, GIVEN ITS LIMITED  
EXPERIENCE IN RWANDA. THE INTERNAL MEMO TO THE  
MINISTERS RECOMMENDED THAT THE GON CONSULT WITH  
BELGIUM AND FRANCE [REDACTED]

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[ ] BEFORE ANNOUNCING A FINAL DECISION TO  
WASHINGTON. (NOTE: WE HOPE THIS RESPONDS TO THE  
CONCERNS RAISED BY EMBASSY BRUSSELS IN REF B.  
END NOTE.)

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4. [ ] SAID HE SAW TWO IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS  
IN STARTING THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS, ONE  
PRACTICAL, ONE THEORETICAL. FIRST, IT WAS  
DIFFICULT TO SEE WHO COULD REPRESENT THE HUTUS  
AND BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES. SECONDLY,  
THERE IS THE NEED FOR "A MAGIC FORMULA." THE  
1993 ARUSHA AGREEMENT HAS LED TO A WHOLE SET OF  
UNINTENDED NEW PROBLEMS, ACCORDING TO [ ]  
ANY NEW RECONCILIATION PROCESS COULD MAINTAIN  
THE SPIRIT, BUT MUST THROW OUT THE LETTER OF  
THAT AGREEMENT. THE PROBLEM IS FINDING A NEW  
APPROACH TO "RECONCILE THE SEEMINGLY  
IRRECONCILABLE."  
DORNBUSH

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